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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 After being found in possession of a glass tube with a trace amount of residue, 
Mr. Willey was convicted of possession of a controlled substance.1  At trial, Mr. Willey 
testified that while in Oregon, he received some glass pipes that he intended to re-blow 
to make into something else.  Mr. Willey told the jury that prior to coming to Idaho, he 
had cleaned those glass pipes in anticipation of re-blowing them and did not know there 
was any methamphetamine in the glass tubes.  Defense counsel requested an 
instruction pursuant to ICJI 1510,2 mistake of fact defense, which the district court 
denied.  On appeal, Mr. Willey asserts the district court committed reversible error by 
failing to instruct the jury on the mistake of fact defense in his case. 
 
Statement of Facts  
 While conducting routine patrol on December 13, 2014, Officer Scott Smith 
stopped a vehicle driven by Mr. Willey because its passenger side taillight was not 
functioning correctly.  (Tr., p.125, Ls.3-24.)  After an initial conversation with Officer 
Smith, Mr. Willey exited his vehicle and started to run.  (Tr., p.127, L.5 – p.131, L.13.)  
Mr. Willey was subsequently detained and officers discovered two glass pipes.  
(Tr., p.133, L.14 – p.138, L.3.)  There was a pipe that “had a little bulb on the end and 
the bulb was a - - had a little hole that was broken off partially” but that pipe looked 
pretty clean.  (Tr., p.138, Ls.9-19.)  Officer Smith testified, “The other pipe was a long, 
straight glass tube and it had a black and sort of white residue in it.”  (Tr., p.138, Ls.17-
                                            
1 Mr. Willey was also convicted of obstructing or delaying an officer and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, but does not challenge those misdemeanor convictions on appeal. 
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19.)  Officer Smith then testified that he performed a NarcoPouch test on the long 
straight pipe and was not able “to scrape any resin off” of that one.  (Tr., p.159, L.11 – 
p.160, L.6.) 
 Forensic scientist Corinna Owsley testified that she performed a Marquis test for 
the presence of methamphetamine or amphetamine on a scrapping of one of the pipes 
but the “identity of the contents on the IR wasn’t pure enough.”  (Tr., p.202, Ls.9-14.)  
She then ran a GC/MS for confirmation and testified the results of her sample “did 
match the standard that we have for methamphetamine.”  (Tr., p.202, L.10 – p.205, L.8.)  
Ms. Owsley testified the amount found was a small amount of residue that could not be 
weighed.  (Tr., p.209, Ls.4-24.) 
 Craig Willey then testified that he is a self-employed artist that does tattoos and 
blows glass.  (Tr., p.240, Ls.11-13.)  Mr. Willey indicated that about a day before his 
arrest, he obtained these glass pipes with the intent of re-blowing the pipes:  “I’m an 
artist and I blow glass.  I do make glass roses and everything else.”  (Tr., p.243, Ls.9-
16.)  Mr. Willey specifically testified that he had not used those specific glass tubes for 
methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.243, Ls.6-8.)  Rather, Mr. Willey had attempted to clean 
those class tubes out and testified that to his “eye” they were clean.  (Tr., p.244, Ls.4-
23.)  Mr. Willey then testified that he did not know there was methamphetamine in those 
pipes, but he “thought it was all cleaned out.”  (Tr., p.247, Ls.9-12.) 
 
Course Of Proceedings 
 Mr. Willey was charged by Information with felony possession of a controlled 
substance and the misdemeanor offenses of driving without privileges, obstructing or 
                                                                                                                                            
2 ICJI stands for Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions. 
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delaying an officer and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.32-34.)  Mr. Willey 
filed a motion to suppress statements made after his arrest, to which the State 
stipulated.  (R., pp.78-85, 100-101.)  Prior to trial, the State dismissed the misdemeanor 
driving without privileges charges.  (R., pp.113, 186.)  Following a jury trial, Mr. Willey 
was convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor obstructing 
or delaying an officer and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.152-
154.)   
The district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two year fixed, 
upon Mr. Willey.  (R., pp.193-196.)  Mr. Willey filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the 
district court’s judgment of conviction and commitment.  (R., pp.199-201.)  Mr. Willey 
then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion (“Rule 35”) which was denied by the district 
court.  (R., pp.197-198, 209-212, 217-220.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court commit reversible error by rejecting Mr. Willey’s mistake of fact 
defense instruction?  
 
 5 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Failed To Instruct The Jury On 
The Mistake Of Fact Defense Pursuant To I.C. § 18-201(1) 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court is required to instruct the jury on a valid theory of defense 
where there is a reasonable view of the evidence in the case that would support the 
theory articulated in the purposed instruction.  Mr. Willey’s testimony that, while in 
another state, he cleaned the pipes he possessed and believed they did not contain 
methamphetamine is sufficient evidence to support his request for a mistake of fact 
defense.  Therefore, the district court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the 
jury on the mistake of fact defense as articulated in I.C. § 18-201(1). 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
If an error was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial, and the 
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the burden shifts to the State to prove the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 
(2010); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  This requires the State to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, “that the constitutional violation did not contribute to 
the jury’s verdict.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. 
“Whether a jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review.”  State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 247 (2008).  To 
determine whether a defendant’s requested instruction should have been given, the 
appellate court “must examine the instructions that were given and the evidence that 
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was adduced at trial.”  State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881 (1987).  This Court also 
exercises “free review over the trial court’s determination of whether due process 
standards have been satisfied.”  State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 788 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 
C. The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Failed To Instruct The 
Jury On The Mistake Of Fact Defense Pursuant To I.C. § 18-201(1) 
  
A trial court must instruct the jury on all matters of law pertinent to their 
considerations.  State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132).  
“A defendant is entitled to an instruction where ‘there is a reasonable view of the 
evidence presented in the case that would support’ the theory” articulated in the 
proposed instruction.   Pearce, 146 Idaho at 247–48 (2008) (quoting State v. Eastman, 
122 Idaho 87, 90 (1992)).  When a reasonable view of the evidence supports the 
instruction requested, the subject matter of the proposed instruction is not covered 
elsewhere in the instructions, and the proposed instruction does not improperly 
comment on the evidence, the “requested instruction on governing law must be given.”  
State v. Fetterly, 126 Idaho 475, 476–77 (Ct. App. 1994).  “If the foregoing criteria are 
met, but the requested instruction incorrectly states the law, the trial court is ‘under the 
affirmative duty to properly instruct the jury.’”  Id. (quoting Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 91 
(1992)).  Erroneous instructions amount to reversible error if “the instructions as a whole 
misled the jury or prejudiced a party.”  State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011). 
Mr. Willey requested the court instruct the jury on ICJI 1510, which provides: 
For a defendant to be guilty of [name of offense], the state must prove the 
defendant had a particular intent.  Evidence was offered at the time of the alleged 
offense the defendant [was ignorant of] [or] [mistakenly believed] certain facts.  
You should consider such evidence in determining whether the defendant had 
the required intent. 
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If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the 
defendant had such intent, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
 
(Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1510; Tr., p.254, L.8 – p.258, L.9.) 
 
Mr. Willey’s requested instruction on mistake of fact defense derives from Idaho 
Code § 18-201, which provides:   
All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those 
belonging to the following classes: 
 
1. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, 
under an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal 
intent. 
. . . .  
 
IDAHO CODE § 18-201(1) (emphasis added). 
 
After initially indicating it was inclined to give the instruction, the district court 
ultimately denied defense counsel request that the jury be instructed consistent with 
ICJI 1510.  (Tr., p.269, L.20 – p.270, L.18, p.272, Ls.7-10.)  The district court concluded: 
I’m not giving the proposed jury instruction, IDJI 1510, because that jury 
instruction is designed for the situation where it has a specific intent crime.  
The - - what the - - the possession of a controlled substance has been 
ruled over and over and over again that it is a general intent, and, 
therefore, the general intent instruction is the appropriate one. 
 
Anderson3 really doesn’t stand for the proposition that 1510 is an 
appropriate jury instruction.  What it stands for is that the State - - and this 
has been the law for quite some time - - the State is - - must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that, in fact, the defendant knew what it was that he 
possessed or that it was a controlled substance.  That’s what it really 
stands for.  And - - that the jury instructions, the very same jury 
instructions we are using here, was - - they were sufficient to explain to 
the jury that it was, in fact, the burden on the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Knowledge is an element of the crime.  So I’m not 
going to give it.  If there is a question, we can address it at that point.  But 
as I understand the defendant’s testimony, he is testifying that he, in fact, 
                                            
3 Although the Court continually refers to “Anderson” it is apparent the Court meant to 
reference State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62 (Ct. App. 2005).  (See Tr. p.274, L.20 – 
p.275, L.9.)  
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did not know that it was there, that he had cleaned it, and, therefore, he 
did not believe it would have any trace of methamphetamine.  That’s up to 
the jury to decide if they believe that.  That’s going to be there decision.  
He has not testified that he used earlier in the day or anything that brings it 
within this Anderson case.  
 
(Tr., p.272, L.7 – p.273, L.14.)   
 After all of the evidence was submitted and the jury was instructed, Mr. Willey 
was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, obstructing or delaying an 
officer and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.152-154.) 
 
1. Mr. Willey Offered Sufficient Evidence For The Mistake Of Fact Instruction 
At trial, Mr. Willey testified that a day before his arrest, he obtained the glass 
pipes in question with the intent of re-blowing them into different forms.  (Tr., p.243, 
Ls.9-16.)  Mr. Willey further testified that he had attempted to clean the class pipes and 
stated that to his “eye” they were clean.  (Tr., p.244, Ls.4-23.)  Finally, Mr. Willey 
testified he had not used methamphetamine in those specific glass tubes and did not 
know there was methamphetamine in those pipes. (Tr., p.243, Ls.6-8; p.247, Ls.9-12.).   
Thus, a reasonable view of the evidence in the case would support the mistake 
of fact defense theory articulated in the purposed instruction.  Pursuant to I.C. § 37-
2732, a defendant must have knowledge of that he is in possession of a 
methamphetamine or a controlled substance.  See I.C. § 37-2732; State v. Fox, 124 
Idaho 924 (1993).  Mr. Willey’s testimony that he thought he had cleaned out the 
entirety of the residue from the glass tubes prior to coming to Idaho would tend to 
negate the mens rea - that he knew he was in possession of methamphetamine or a 
controlled substance.  Rather, Mr. Willey’s mistaken belief that he did not remove all 
residue from the pipes while in Oregon is a mistake of fact and he was entitled an 
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instruction for the mistake of fact defense of ICJI 1510 as provided for in Idaho Code § 
18-201(1). 
 
2. ICJI 1510 Is Applicable To Any Offense In Which A Mistake Of Fact May 
Negate The Intent Element Of The Offense 
 
The district court refused to give the jury instruction because “that jury instruction 
is designed for the situation where it is a specific intent crime.”  (Tr., p.272, Ls.7-10.)  
While not entirely clear, it appears the district court’s position that ICJI 1510, the 
mistake of fact jury instruction, is designed for a specific intent crime, is based upon the 
court’s review of the comments to ICJI 1510.  The first comment to ICJI 1510 provides, 
“Ignorance or mistake of fact is only a defense to a crime having a specific intent as an 
element.  State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405, 788 P.2d 220 (1990).”  See ICJI 1510.   
The Stiffler Opinion does not necessarily stand for the proposition that the 
ignorance or mistake of fact defense is only a defense to a specific intent crime.  In 
Stiffler, Justice Johnson wrote the first part of the opinion, to which Justices Bakes and 
Boyle concurred.  117 Idaho at 405-410.  Justices Boyle and McDevitt each wrote 
separate opinions, “specially concurring.”  Id. at 410-411.  Justice Bistline wrote a 
dissenting opinion.  Id. at 411-414.  The portion of the opinion authored by Justice 
Johnson identifies its holding as “We affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals and 
trial court and hold that a reasonable mistake of fact concerning the female’s age does 
not disprove criminal intent in a statutory rape case.”  Id. at 405.  Justice Johnson 
identifies the issue to be decided as, “[t]he precise question we must address in this 
case is whether any mistake Stiffler may have had about the age of the female with 
whom he had sexual intercourse would disprove the criminal intent required before he 
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could be convicted of statutory rape.”  Id. at 406.  Justice Johnson then posits, “[i]n 
order to resolve the issue presented here, we must determine whether commission of 
the crime of statutory rape requires any specific intent.”  Id.  Justice Johnson next 
writes, without any citation to authority, “[i]f we were to determine that statutory rape 
requires only general intent, mistake of age would not be a defense, since any mistake 
of age would not disprove that Stiffler had sexual intercourse with a female under the 
age of eighteen.”  Id. at 407.  Justice Johnson concluded that statutory rape was not a 
specific intent crime and a mistake of age would not be a defense.  Id. at 407-410. 
Although Justice Boyle is identifying as concurring, he wrote a separate opinion 
specially concurring, wherein he stated:  
In my opinion the issue presented to us on appeal can be resolved 
by simply holding that mistake of the victim's age is not a defense to the 
crime of statutory rape. It is not necessary that we place this unique crime 
into a general or specific intent crime category or analyze the effect of 
mens rea or make a distinction between acts mala in se and acts mala 
prohibita as those principles relate to statutory rape. If I felt it necessary to 
make an analysis of general and specific intent distinctions I would urge 
adoption of the language used by Judge Burnett in his special concurring 
opinion in State v. McDougall, 113 Idaho 900, 749 P.2d 1025 
(Ct.App.1988). However, I do not feel that is necessary in resolving this 
case and it is sufficient to conclude that mistake of the victim's age is not a 
defense to statutory rape. The legislature's adoption of I.C. § 18–201(1) 
does not change this well-established principle of law as applied to 
statutory rape. Accordingly, I concur in the result for the reasons stated 
herein.  
 
Id. at 410-411.  Thus, although Justice Boyle concurred with Justice Johnson’s opinion, 
it is apparent he was only concurring in the result.  Justice McDevitt’s specially 
concurred on the basis that “the legislature, in codifying the crime of statutory rape, 
intended to incorporate the immemorial tradition of the common law that a mistake of 
fact as to the complainant’s age is no defense.”  Id. at 411-412.  In his dissent, Justice 
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Bistline concluded that Stiffler should have been given the opportunity to present the 
defense.  Id. at 412-414.  Thus, viewed in its entirety, the Stiffler opinion does not stand 
for the proposition that the ignorance or mistake of fact defense is only a defense to a 
specific intent crime, as only two of the five justices agreed with that aspect of the 
opinion. 
 However, even if Stiffler held that ignorance or mistake of fact is only a defense 
to a specific intent crime, it has been overruled.  See State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 
356 P.3d 368 (2015); State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630 (1997).  In Lamphere, the 
Court, recognizing that possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime, 
held that a defense of mistake of fact was available to Lampere where his defense was 
“that he did not know the nature of the residue in the vial he possessed.”  130 Idaho at 
633.  Likewise, most recently in McKean, the Idaho Supreme Court observed the crime 
of possession of a controlled substance was a general intent crime and a mistake of 
fact, “the defendant’s ignorance of the identity of a substance would be a defense . . . .”  
159 Idaho ___, 356 P.3d at 375-76. 
 Thus, the district court erred in concluding that the defense of mistake of fact was 
not applicable to the charge facing Mr. Willey because possession of a controlled 
substance is a general intent crime.  Accordingly, because the district court erred in 
failing to instruct the jury on ICJI 1510, the mistake of fact defense, his conviction 
should be vacated. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Willey respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance and remand his case for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 28th day of April, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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